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Abstract
Anomalies in future-oriented cognition are implicated in the maintenance of emotional disturbance within cognitive models 
of depression. Thinking about the future can involve mental imagery or verbal-linguistic mental representations. Research 
suggests that future thinking involving imagery representations may disproportionately impact on-going emotional experi-
ence in daily life relative to future thinking not involving imagery (verbal-linguistic representation only). However, while 
higher depression symptoms (dysphoria) are associated with impaired ability to deliberately generate positive relatively to 
negative imagery representations of the future (when instructed to do so), it is unclear whether dysphoria is associated with 
impairments in the tendency to do so spontaneously (when not instructed to deliberately generate task unrelated cognition of 
any kind). The present study investigated dysphoria-linked individual differences in the tendency to experience spontaneous 
future-oriented cognition as a function of emotional valence and representational format. Individuals varying in dysphoria 
level reported the occurrence of task unrelated thoughts (TUTs) in real time while completing a sustained attention go/
no-go task, during exposure to auditory cues. Results indicate higher levels of dysphoria were associated with lower levels 
of positive bias in the number of imagery-based future TUTs reported, reflecting higher negative imagery-based future TUT 
generation (medium to large effect size), and lower positive imagery-based TUT generation (small to medium effect size). 
Further, this dysphoria-linked bias appeared to be specific in temporal orientation (future, not past) and representational 
format (imagery, not non-imagery). Reduced tendency to engage in positive relative to negative imagery-based future think-
ing appears to be implicated in dysphoria.
Keywords Dysphoria · Spontaneous future thinking · Mental time travel · Mindwandering · Mental imagery · Cognitive 
bias
Introduction
Disproportionately negative future-oriented cognition is 
implicated in the aetiology and maintenance of emotional 
disturbance within cognitive models of depression (Abram-
son, Metalsky, & Alloy, 1989; Beck, 1976; Beck, Brown, 
Steer, Eidelson, & Riskind, 1987). Empirical evidence has 
shown that, when asked to deliberately evaluate or anticipate 
future events, individuals with depression exhibit pessimis-
tic judgments of their personal futures (Alloy & Ahrens, 
1987; MacLeod et al., 2005; Miranda & Mennin, 2007), and 
show impaired ability to anticipate positive relative to nega-
tive future events (Holmes, Lang, Moulds, & Steele, 2008; 
MacLeod & Conway, 2007; MacLeod & Salaminiou, 2001; 
Morina, Deeprose, Pusowski, Schmid, & Holmes, 2011). 
However, research suggests that the emotional consequences 
of mental representations of future events are greater when 
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such representations occur spontaneously, without instruc-
tion or intention, relative to when such representations 
were generated deliberately (Cole, Staugaard, & Berntsen, 
2016). Further, experience sampling research suggests that 
the emotional consequences of future-oriented mental rep-
resentations appear to be restricted to those involving mental 
imagery (Barsics, Van der Linden, & D’Argembeau, 2016). 
As such, understanding biases in the tendency to sponta-
neously engage in mental imagery-based emotional future 
thinking may further illuminate the link between future-
oriented cognition and emotional disturbance in depression.
Mental imagery can evoke emotional response 
in an as‑if‑real manner
Consciously experienced mental representations can occur 
in mental imagery format, or verbal-linguistic format 
(Paivio, 1990). Mental imagery refers to internal represen-
tations of sensory-perceptual information in the absence of 
external sensory input, often referred to as “‘seeing from 
the mind’s eye’, ‘hearing from the mind’s ear’, and so on” 
(Kosslyn, Ganis, & Thompson, 2001, p. 635). Due to the 
recruitment of common neural substrates during mental 
imagery and sensory perception (Cichy, Heinzle, & Haynes, 
2012; Klein et al., 2004; Kosslyn, 1994; Pearson & Kosslyn, 
2015), mental imagery has the capacity to simulate not only 
the perceptual details of hypothetical events, but also the 
experiential correlates of such experiences in an as-if-real 
manner (Lang, 1979; Moulton & Kosslyn, 2011). Research 
has demonstrated the capacity for imagery representations of 
emotion stimuli to evoke emotional response at subjective, 
physiological, and neural levels (see Ji, Heyes, MacLeod, & 
Holmes, 2016). In healthy individuals, many studies have 
demonstrated that when asked to deliberately engage in men-
tal imagery representations relative to verbal-linguistic rep-
resentations of negative and positive information, imagery 
representations tend to evoke greater emotional response, 
at least at subjective levels (Holmes, Lang, & Shah, 2009; 
Holmes & Mathews, 2005; Holmes, Mathews, Mackintosh, 
& Dalgleish, 2008; Mathews, Ridgeway, & Holmes, 2013; 
Nelis, Vanbrabant, Holmes, & Raes, 2012).
Maladaptive cognition implicated in emotional disorders 
often involves mental imagery, although the focus has been 
on anxiety related disorders (Holmes & Mathews, 2010). 
Seminal theories of depression refer to both “thoughts and 
visual images” (p. 8) as relevant factors in the aetiology 
and treatment of depression (Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emergy, 
1979). More recently, a large questionnaire-based study 
investigating the properties of depressive thoughts found 
that more than half of 403 depressed patients reported their 
depressive thoughts to involve auditory and visual mental 
imagery (Moritz et al., 2014), suggesting that cognition 
involving mental imagery may be a prevalent feature of 
maladaptive cognition in depression too. Given the capacity 
for mental imagery to strongly impact emotional experience, 
investigating depression-linked biases in the tendency to 
experience mental representations involving mental imagery 
(whether consisting of imagery only, or a combination of 
imagery and verbal thought) is of particular importance 
for understanding the cognitive basis of such emotional 
psychopathology.
Spontaneous future imagery‑evoked emotional 
response
More recently, experience sampling research assessing the 
real-time occurrence of future-oriented thoughts and emo-
tional states throughout the day has shown that individuals 
are more likely to experience negative or positive thoughts 
about the future following experiences of negative or posi-
tive emotional states, respectively (Barsics et al., 2016). In 
turn, the occurrence of such negative or positive thoughts 
about the future are associated with increases in subsequent 
experiences of negative and positive emotional states, indi-
cating a bi-directional relationship between future-oriented 
cognition and state emotion (Barsics et al., 2016). An impor-
tant aspect of Barsics et al.’s finding is that this relationship 
was restricted to emotional future-oriented cognition involv-
ing mental imagery, as the occurrence of emotional future 
cognition not involving mental imagery (i.e. verbal-linguistic 
thought) was not related to subsequent emotional states. As 
such, higher levels of negative, or indeed depressed, mood 
may arise, and be maintained by, a disproportionate ten-
dency to spontaneously engage in negative relative to posi-
tive future thinking, particularly if such thinking involves 
mental imagery.
Biases in mental imagery‑based future thinking 
in depression
Abnormalities in mental imagery-based cognition have been 
implicated in depression, indicating elevated accessibility of 
imagery-based mental representations and reduced acces-
sibility of positive imagery-based mental representations 
(Holmes, Blackwell, Burnett Heyes, Renner, & Raes, 2016). 
For example, when asked to deliberately anticipate nega-
tive and positive events in one’s personal future, individuals 
with higher depression symptoms are able to anticipate more 
negative future experiences and fewer positive future experi-
ences than those with lower depression symptoms (MacLeod 
& Byrne, 1996; MacLeod & Salaminiou, 2001; for a review 
see MacLeod, 2016). When asked to deliberately generate 
imagery representations of future events in response to cues, 
higher depression symptoms are associated with reduced 
specificity of future events, particularly in response to posi-
tive cues (Hallford, Austin, Takano, & Raes, 2018), and 
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reduced imagery vividness for positive relative to negative 
events (Holmes, et al., 2008; Morina et al., 2011; Szőllősi, 
Pajkossy, & Racsmány, 2015).
Reduced ability to deliberately generate imagery-based 
positive relative to negative representations of the future 
could potentially explain why individuals with higher 
depression symptoms have a reduced positive mood and ele-
vated negative mood. However, depression-linked individual 
differences in the relative ability to generate positive and 
negative future imageries in response to direct instruction 
may not necessarily align with depression-linked individual 
differences in the relative tendency to do so without such 
instructions. Laboratory research in healthy individuals has 
shown that the emotional impact of spontaneously generated 
mental imagery representations of future events is greater 
relative to deliberately generated mental imagery representa-
tions of future events (Cole et al., 2016). Therefore, inves-
tigating depression-linked biases in the tendency to engage 
in emotional future imagery may further illuminate the role 
of future thinking and emotional disturbance in depression.
Limited understanding of spontaneous mental 
imagery‑based future thinking in depression
Compared to research on the ability to generate future 
imagery in depression when deliberately instructed to 
generate such imagery (deliberate generation), research 
on depression-linked tendency to generate future imagery 
when not instructed to do so (spontaneous generation) is 
relatively neglected. In community samples, higher levels 
of depression symptoms appear to be related to higher fre-
quency of self-reported daily experiences of negative mental 
imagery, and less frequent experiences of positive imagery 
(Weßlau, Cloos, Höfling, & Steil, 2015). Patients with 
depression report frequently experiencing unwanted mental 
imagery in the form of spontaneously occurring emotionally 
distressing mental imagery of past and future experiences 
(Brewin, Gregory, Lipton, & Burgess, 2010; Moritz et al., 
2014; Patel et al., 2007). However, these and other studies 
have tended to rely on retrospective estimations of the fre-
quency of distressing mental imagery (Newby & Moulds, 
2011; Patel et al., 2007; Reynolds & Brewin, 1998). Given 
that naturally occurring thoughts tend to be rapidly forgotten 
if their occurrence is not recorded immediately (Berntsen, 
1996), such as in a thought diary or via a button press during 
a computer task, interpretation of retrospective reports of 
thought frequency is thus constrained. In contrast, assessing 
the frequency of cognition as it occurs in real time has the 
potential to provide a more accurate assessment of naturally 
occurring thought frequency.
Few laboratory studies have assessed depression-linked 
individual differences in spontaneous mental imagery-based 
future thinking frequency in real time. Previous research 
has shown that spontaneous thoughts tended to occur during 
states of diffused attention when the individual felt bored, 
tired, or unengaged with the task at hand (Berntsen, 1996; 
Kosslyn, Seger, Pani, Hillger, and Stephen, 1990; McVay 
& Kane, 2010). Therefore, laboratory studies designed to 
induce states of diffused attention are suitable for measuring 
task unrelated thought frequency, such as low-demand sus-
tained attention to response tasks involving go/no-go tasks 
(Robertson, Manly, Andrade, Baddeley, & Yiend, 1997). 
In addition, previous research has shown that spontaneous 
cognition is often triggered by external cues (Kvavilashvili 
& Mandler, 2004; Plimpton, Patel, & Kvavilashvili, 2015). 
Therefore, exposing participants to standardised environ-
mental cues is more appropriate for investigating depres-
sion-linked individual differences in spontaneous cognition 
frequency than experience sampling studies ‘in-the-wild’, 
particularly as depression symptoms are likely to influence 
the selection of environmental context in daily life.
Kvavilashvili and colleagues (Kvavilashvili & Schlag-
man, 2011; Schlagman & Kvavilashvili, 2008) developed 
a variant of the sustained attentional vigilance tasks that 
additionally exposed participants to visually presented ver-
bal cues. Using this approach, studies have found no signifi-
cant relationship between depression symptom level and the 
general frequency of future-oriented task unrelated thoughts 
(TUTs) (Hoffmann, Banzhaf, Kanske, Bermpohl, & Singer, 
2016; Plimpton et  al., 2015), although Hoffmann et  al. 
(2016) found future-oriented TUTs to be more emotionally 
negative in depressed relative to non-depressed individu-
als. However, such studies did not examine the frequency 
of future-oriented TUTs as a function of their emotional 
valence. It is therefore unclear whether dysphoria level is 
related to the tendency to spontaneously generate more 
negative relative to positive future TUTs.
Most importantly, no study investigating depression-
linked individual differences in spontaneous future think-
ing has addressed whether (and to what extent) these vary 
with representational format, i.e. emotional future repre-
sentations that involve mental imagery versus those that do 
not. In addition, imagining hypothetical future experiences 
(episodic simulation) recruits the core neural networks sup-
porting episodic memory of past experiences, involving the 
flexible recombination of relevant contextual and sensory 
features from past experiences (Addis, Wong, & Schacter, 
2007; Schacter, Addis, & Buckner, 2007, 2008). Therefore, 
it would be important to understand whether any relationship 
observed between depression symptom level and the ten-
dency to experience mental imagery-based emotional future 
TUTs are unique to future-oriented TUTs by examining the 
relationship between depression symptom level and the ten-
dency to experience mental imagery-based emotional past 
TUTs. If the same pattern of relationship was found between 
depression symptom level and both past- and future-oriented 
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TUTs, then effects are likely to reflect depression-linked 
biases in the tendency to engage in emotional mental time 
travel in general, rather than a bias specific to the tendency 
to imagine emotional futures.
The present study
The present laboratory study aims to investigate individual 
differences in the tendency to engage in spontaneous men-
tal imagery-based emotional future thinking in participants 
varying in the level of self-reported symptoms of dysphoria 
(as indicated by depression questionnaire scores).
Examining depression-linked individual differences in 
thought frequency requires a task that is capable of evok-
ing sufficient variation in the occurrence of TUTs. While 
most previous studies have used intermittent and infre-
quent random thought probes to assess TUT occurrence, 
the limitation with the probe-caught sampling approach is 
the fixed and low number of data points obtainable during 
brief laboratory tasks (typically 15–20 min). This “probe-
caught” method is able to capture only a fraction of actual 
task unrelated thoughts, and such an approach may not yield 
sufficient variability in valid data points for examining the 
presence of systematic relationships between an individu-
als’ emotional states and the occurrence of particular types 
of cognition (e.g. future-oriented emotional task unrelated 
thoughts involving mental imagery). In contrast, self-report-
ing occurrences of mindwandering have the potential capac-
ity to capture a greater proportion of the occurrences of task 
unrelated cognition, increasing the chance of obtaining suf-
ficient data points for group-level frequency comparisons of 
cognition by valence and mode using means or rank order 
analysis. As such, following previous research (Cole et al., 
2016), the present study employed a “self-caught” method, 
where participants self-reported TUTs as they occurred.
A novel task unrelated thinking (TUT) task was devel-
oped based on the Sustained Attention to Response Task 
(SART) by Robertson, Manly, Andrade, Baddeley, & Yiend 
(1997). The standard SART is a go/no-go task, which 
involves the withholding of key presses to rare targets (one 
in nine trials being a no-go trial). The SART measures lapses 
in sustained attention as a result of shifts from controlled 
to automatic processing (Robertson et al., 1997), and is 
widely used in mindwandering research (Christoff, Gordon, 
Smallwood, Smith, & Schooler, 2009; Smallwood, Beach, & 
Schooler, 2008). Previous research has shown that the same 
task with a high target frequency (one in two) induces less 
mindwandering relative to the standard low target frequency 
version (one in nine) in both low and high dysphoria samples 
(Murphy, Macpherson, Manly, & Dunn, 2013). The present 
study therefore utilised the standard low target frequency 
SART to encourage mindwandering and the emergence of 
task unrelated thoughts.
Further, the SART was modified to include exposure to 
standardised external cues in the form of emotional and 
non-emotional words presented during the SART task. This 
novel variant of the SART is similar to another vigilance 
task involving the presentation of verbal cues, developed by 
Schlagman & Kvavilashvili (2008) and used in studies such 
as Plimpton et al. (2015). However, the present TUT task 
differs to that of Schlagman & Kvavilashvili (2008)’s cued 
TUT approach in two key aspects. First, while Schlagman 
& Kvavilashvili (2008) visually presented verbal cues in 
the centre of the screen on every trial and participants were 
instructed to ignore the cues as they were task irrelevant, this 
invariably introduced visual attentional competition with the 
main task (discriminating the identity of visually presented 
line patterns), thereby making the task more difficult and less 
monotonous. In addition, participants were asked to indicate 
during the task whether each TUT reported was related to 
a visually presented verbal cue, which invariably reduces 
the task irrelevance of cues and increases awareness of cues 
during the task. The present task therefore used aurally pre-
sented verbal cues and participants were not required to indi-
cate whether their TUTs were related to cues. Participants 
reported the occurrence of self-caught TUTs in real time 
during a number digit vigilance task while simultaneously 
exposed to task contexts that were emotional (negative and 
positive verbal cues) and unemotional (neutral verbal cues). 
To rule out the contribution of additional depression-linked 
factors that could affect TUT frequency, such as task diffi-
culty or cue processing, the relationship between dysphoria 
level and task performance (errors of commission) and cue 
recognition memory were assessed.
Hypotheses
The study tested the hypothesis that higher levels of dyspho-
ria would be associated with greater tendency to spontane-
ously engage in negative relative to positive mental imagery-
based future thinking. Spontaneous cognition is defined as 
TUTs generated without instructions to generate cognition 
of any particular kind.
The study further aimed to explore whether any observed 
relationship between dysphoria level and the tendency to 
generate emotional imagery future-TUTs was (a) specific to 
emotionally toned imagery future-TUTs (emotional specific-
ity); (b) specific to imagery-based emotional future TUTs 
(representational format specificity); and (c) specific to 
future-oriented imagery TUTs (temporal orientation speci-
ficity). To verify (a) emotional specificity, the relationship 
between depression scores and neutral imagery future-TUT 
frequency will be assessed; to verify (b) representational for-
mat specificity, the relationship between depression scores 
and emotional future-oriented non-imagery TUTs will be 
assessed; and to verify (c) temporal orientation specificity, 
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the relationship between depression score and emotional 
past-oriented imagery TUTs will be assessed. Given previ-
ous research on depression-linked reduction in positive rela-
tive to negative future imagery vividness when such imagery 
was deliberately generated, the present study also explored 
the vividness of spontaneously generated future imagery.
Method
Participants
Forty-five introductory psychology students at the University 
of Western Australia participated in the study. Recruitment 
was guided by a mass screening of more than 900 students 
using the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI-II; Beck, Steer, 
& Brown, 1996). Individuals scoring in the top, middle as 
well as bottom third of the BDI-II score distribution were 
invited to the study to obtain a wide spread of BDI-II scores 
in our sample. Sample size was guided by a priori power 
analysis using the R package “pwr” (Champely et al., 2018) 
based on (Cohen, 1988), for achieving 80% power to detect 
a medium effect size (guided by previous unpublished stud-
ies in the lab), r = 0.40 and α = 0.05. Participants received 
course credit for their participation in the study. The study 
was approved by the University of Western Australia’s 
Human Research Ethics Office (ethics code: RA/4/1/5243).
Materials
Questionnaires
Depression symptom level was assessed using the Beck 
Depression Inventory-II (BDI-II; Beck, Steer, & Brown, 
1996), a 21-item self-report scale measuring the level of 
depressed mood, cognition, and physical symptoms over 
the previous 2 weeks. Each item is rated on a 4-point scale, 
indicating increasing symptom severity. The BDI-II has high 
internal consistency (Storch, Roberti, & Roth, 2004) and 
concurrent validity, correlating highly with other measures 
of depressed mood, such as the DASS Depression subscale 
(Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995).
Task Unrelated Thinking task (TUTT) stimuli
Stimuli consisted of nine numerical digits and 270 singular 
words. The digits “1” to “9” were visually presented in Arial 
font (size 18). The words were selected from the Affective 
Norms for English Words corpus (ANEW; Bradley & Lang, 
1999) based on normative ratings of emotional valence. 
Ninety words were selected from the top end of emotional 
valence scores (emotionally positive); ninety words were 
selected from the bottom end of emotional valence ratings 
(emotionally negative), and 90 were selected from mid-
point of emotional valence ratings (emotionally neutral). 
As desired, words selected for the three word categories 
significantly differed in emotional valence scores, with 
positive words having higher scores than neutral words, and 
neutral words having higher scores than negative words, 
F (2, 240) = 1910.95, p < 0.001, ƞ2p = 0.94. Negative and 
positive cue words did not differ in ANEW Arousal rating 
scores, F (1, 160) = 0.04, p = 0.85. All words were recorded 
by a female native-British English speaker and edited 
using Adobe Audition 3.0 (all sound files were 1000 ms in 
duration).
TUTT cue recognition memory test stimuli
The surprise cue recognition memory test administered fol-
lowing the TUTT was a pen-and-paper measure comprising 
120 words, 60 of which were true cue words (20 negative, 
20 positive, 20 neutral), and 60 were foil words (20 negative, 
20 positive, 20 neutral). True and foil words did not dif-
fer in BNC word frequency, F = 1.793, p = 0.183. True and 
foil also did not differ in ANEW valence or arousal ratings 
(Bradley & Lang, 1999) across valence categories, all F (2, 
114) < 2.034, all p > 0.135.
Experimental hardware
Task stimuli were presented via a 19-inch computer moni-
tor set at 1280 × 1024 resolution (60 Hz refresh rate), with 
auditory stimuli presented via noise-cancelling headphones. 
A standard keyboard was used to record participants’ 
responses.
Tasks
Task Unrelated Thinking task (TUTT)
The task unrelated thinking task (TUTT) was programmed 
using E-Prime 2.0 (Psychology Software Tools). The task 
was approximately 20–25 min in duration, and comprised 
270 trials. On each trial, participants were presented with a 
500 ms fixation cross, followed by the presentation of one 
numeral digit on the computer screen for 1000 ms, together 
with the simultaneous presentation of one word via head-
phones, lasting 1000 ms or less. Stimuli presentation was 
followed by a 1000 ms blank screen, making the inter-stim-
ulus interval (ISI) 2500 ms, in line with previous literature 
(Smallwood, Fitzgerald, Miles, & Phillips, 2009). Number 
digits ranged from one to nine, appearing with equal prob-
ability in pseudo-random order (constrained to ensure no 
repeats of same digit on successive trials). Auditory cue 
words were presented in separate positive, neutral, and neg-
ative blocks, such that all negative words were presented 
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together, and likewise for positive and neutral words, with 
presentation order of the three blocks counterbalanced 
across participants.
Participants were instructed to press the “3” key on the 
number keypad (labelled “Go”) as soon as a number other 
than 3 appeared on the screen (240 trials), and to withhold 
the button press when the numerical digit was the number 
3 (30 trials). In addition, participants were also instructed 
to report task unrelated thoughts by pressing the “1” key 
on the number keypad (labelled with the drawing of a star 
sign). This key press paused the task to present rating ques-
tions. The first ratings asked participants to indicate (A) 
whether the task unrelated thought (TUT) was (1) mental 
imagery; (2) verbal linguistic; or (3) both; (B) how vivid 
the TUT was if it involved imagery; and/or how elaborate 
the TUT was if it was verbal-linguistic, on a 5-point Likert 
scale ranging from 1 (Not at all) to 5 (Extremely); (C) how 
emotionally negative or positive the thought content was on 
a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (Very negative) to 5 (Very 
positive); and (D) the temporal orientation of TUT content 
on an 8-point scale, consisting of 1 (past—years); 2 (past—
months); 3 (past—days/weeks), 4 (present), 5 (future—days/
weeks); 6 (future—months); 7 (future—years); 8 atemporal. 
The digit vigilance task resumed when participants had pro-
vided ratings for all questions.
TUTT cue recognition memory test
The test comprised a three-page paper-based task and par-
ticipants were instructed to tick “yes” if the word was one 
the participant remembered hearing during the task, and 
“no” if they did not remember the word as one they heard 
during the task.
Procedure
Participants were tested individually. Upon arriving at the 
laboratory, participants gave written informed consent and 
completed demographics information and the BDI-II ques-
tionnaire. Participants were then told that they were taking 
part in a concentration task, and were required to respond 
to a series of numerical digits on the screen while words 
played via the headphones. Participants were informed that 
on each trial, in addition to seeing numerical digits on the 
screen, they would also hear words from the headphones, 
which simply formed part of the task environment and that 
they were not required to respond to the words in this task.
Following instructions on how to complete the digit 
vigilance task, participants were informed that due to the 
monotonous nature of the task, most people’s minds tend 
to wander off frequently to think other things unrelated to 
doing this task right now. Participants were told that think-
ing about unrelated things was completely normal and they 
should not try to prevent it from occurring. Participants were 
then instructed to press the “star” key on the number pad 
whenever they realised they had been thinking about some-
thing unrelated to task. The experimenter then explained the 
differences between mental imagery and verbal-linguistic 
thoughts, and participants’ understanding were verified 
before completing 15 practice trials in the presence of the 
experimenter, where participants also practiced the TUT 
reporting component of the task even if they did not experi-
ence any TUTs during the short practice period.
The experimenter then left the room and participants 
completed the task, followed by the surprise
Cue recognition memory test
Finally, participants were debriefed and given course credit 
for their participation.
Data analyses plan
Coding of TUTs
The frequency of future-oriented TUTs was extracted as a 
function of its emotional valence, representational format 
and temporal orientation, based on participants’ ratings. 
For representational format, TUTs reported to involve men-
tal imagery or both mental imagery and verbal-linguistic 
thoughts were categorised as imagery TUTs, whereas 
TUTs involving only verbal-linguistic thought were con-
sidered non-imagery TUTs. For emotional valence, TUTs 
rated “4-positive” or “5-very positive” were categorised 
as positive, TUTs rated “1-very negative” or “2-negative” 
were categorised as negative, and TUTs rated “3-neutral” 
were categorised as neutral. For temporal orientation, TUTs 
rated 1 (past—years), 2 (past—months) or 3 (past—days/
weeks) were categorised as past-TUTs; and all TUTs rated 
5 (future—days/weeks), 6 (future—months) or 7 (future—
years) were categorised as future-TUTs.
To investigate the representational format and temporal 
orientation specificity of any observed mood-congruent bias 
effects, TUTs are computed as a function of their emotional 
valence category (positive, negative, neutral), and as a func-
tion of their representational format (involving imagery, not 
involving imagery) and temporal orientation (past, present, 
future, atemporal). Given that the total number of TUTs is 
likely to differ across individuals, comparisons of TUT fre-
quency as a function of TUT type within individuals (as 
well as across individuals) should take into account overall 
differences in TUT frequency. In addition, given the rela-
tively low number of TUTs per category, computing percent-
ages within categories (e.g. positive future TUTs involv-
ing imagery as a percentage of all future TUTs involving 
imagery) are likely to lead to large variations in percentages 
Psychological Research 
1 3
when the variation in the raw number is minimal, Therefore, 
to take into account general individual differences in TUT 
frequency and to minimize distortion in the data, all TUT 
frequencies are computed as percentages of the total TUTs 
for each participant.
For hypotheses testing, Spearman’s rank order1 correla-
tional analyses were conducted between BDI-II scores and 
the following outcome variable bias scores. If the predicted 
relationship was found, planned post-hoc correlational 
analyses with positive and negative imagery future-TUT 
frequency scores were conducted separately to evaluate the 
presence of independent valence effects driving the results 
observed from bias scores.
In assessing dysphoria-linked bias in the tendency to 
generate emotional future TUTs involving mental imagery, 
to aid interpretation of valence bias scores, negative future 
imagery-TUTs are subtracted from positive future imagery-
TUTs such that scores above zero indicate the presence of 
a positive bias, and scores below zero indicate the presence 
of a negative bias. The imagery future-TUT bias scores were 
computed via the following formula:
To assess the emotional specificity of observed depres-
sion-linked bias in imagery future-TUT tendency, emotion-
ally neutral future-TUTs involving mental imagery will be 
correlated with BDI-II scores.
To assess the representation format specificity of 
observed depression-linked bias in imagery future-TUT ten-
dency, non-imagery future-TUT positivity bias scores were 
computed via the following formula:
To assess the temporal orientation specificity of observed 
depression-linked bias in imagery future-TUT tendency, 
imagery past-TUT positivity bias scores were computed via 
the following formula:
Imagery Future-TUT Positivity Bias Score
= positive imagery future-TUTs (% of total TUTs)
− negative imagery future-TUTs (% of total TUTs).
Non-imagery Future-TUT Positivity Bias Score
= positive non-imagery future-TUTs (% of TUTs)
− negative non-imagery future-TUTs (% of TUTs).
Imagery Past-TUT Positivity Bias Score
= positive imagery past-TUTs(% of total TUTs)
− negative imagery past-TUTs(% of total TUTs).
To assess task performance, inattentional errors during 
the TUTT task as indicated by errors of commission (fail-
ure to withhold button press on trials where the number is 
“3”) was correlated with BDI-II scores. We also conducted 
additional exploratory analyses assessing the presence of 
group differences in cue processing, as measured by per-
formance on a surprise recognition memory task (TUTT 
Cue Recognition Memory Test) at the end of the study (see 
Supplementary Materials A for analysis plan).
Results
Participant characteristics
Data from two participants were lost due to technical issues. 
Further, one participant did not report any TUTs and was 
thus excluded from data analysis. Of the remaining 42 par-
ticipants, BDI-II scores ranged from 0 to 37 (M = 10.84; 
SD = 9.44).2 Average participant age was M = 21.55 years, 
SD = 6.08; average education level was M = 13.58 years, 
SD = 1.89. Of the 42 participants, 25 were female (59.5%), 
and 90% self-identified as native English speakers.
Task performance
Performance on the SART is critically measured by the 
rate of errors of commission, which is the number of no-go 
trials on which a participant fails to withhold a keypress 
response. On average, commission error rate was M = 3.67, 
SD = 3.71. No significant relationship was found between 
BDI-II scores and errors of commission, rs = 0.21, p = 0.18, 
indicating dysphoria level was not significantly related to the 
degree of attentional lapse in the task. Task performance can 
also be indexed using errors of omission, i.e. the number of 
go trials on which a participant fails to execute a keypress 
response. Omission error rate in the present study was 0, 
as all participants executed the required keypress on all go 
trials, either during the stimulus presentation window or in 
the subsequent mask window, similar to previous findings 
(Murphy et al., 2013).
Signal detection performance on the TUTT Cue Recog-
nition Memory Test indicated no significant group differ-
ences in cue processing (see Supplementary Materials A 
for results).
1 Non-parametric statistical tests of correlation were used as the data 
were heavily skewed to the right, such that no corrections (e.g. log 
transformation) could normalize the distribution, rendering it uname-
nable to parametric correlational analyses.
2 1 Based on cutoffs used in previous research using the BDI-II to 
assess high and low levels of dysphoria (e.g. Berna, Lang, Goodwin, 
& Holmes, 2011; Holmes, Lang, et  al., 2008), our participant sam-
ple had approximately equal numbers with low dysphoria (BDI-II < 6, 
n = 15), high dysphoria (BDI-II > 13, n = 12), with the rest falling in 
between low and high dysphoria (n = 15).
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Spontaneous task unrelated thought frequency
General characteristics
Overall, participants generated a total of 763 task unrelated 
thoughts (TUTs), with an average of M = 18.17, SD = 11.20. 
BDI-II score was not related to total TUT raw frequency, rs 
= 0.14 p = 0.38. With respect to emotional valence, a total 
of 162 TUTs (21.23%) were negative; 279 (36.57%) were 
positive; and 322 (42.20%) were neutral. With respect to rep-
resentational format, a total of 488 TUTs (63.96%) involved 
mental imagery [mental imagery only: 269 (35.26%); mental 
imagery + verbal linguistic: 219 (28.70%), and 275 TUTs 
(36.04%) did not involve mental imagery (verbal-linguistic 
only)]. With respect to temporal orientation, a total of 242 
TUTs (31.72%) were past-oriented; 224 (29.36%) were pre-
sent-oriented; 147 (19.27%) were future-oriented; and 150 
(19.66%) were atemporal in nature. Mean (raw and propor-
tional to total) TUT frequency as a function of emotional 
valence, representational format and temporal orientation 
are presented in Table 1.
Influence of auditory verbal cues
The valence of TUTs was influenced by the emotional tone 
of auditory cues, as emotionally negative TUTs were most 
frequently reported in the negative cue block; emotionally 
neutral TUTs were most frequently reported in the neutral 
cue block; and emotionally positive TUTs were most fre-
quently reported in the positive cue block. See Supplemen-
tary Materials for additional data and explanation.
Depression‑linked bias in the tendency 
to experience emotional future‑oriented TUTs 
involving mental imagery
Imagery Future-TUT Positivity Bis Score was correlated 
with BDI-II scores. As predicted, a significant negative 
relationship was found between BDI-II scores and Imagery 
Future-TUT Positivity Bias Scores, rs (40) = − 0.42, 
p = 0.006. This relationship is depicted in Fig. 1. Planned 
post-hoc analysis revealed a significant positive relationship 
with the frequency of negative imagery-based future TUTs, 
rs (40) = 0.46, p = 0.002; and a smaller negative relation-
ship between BDI-II scores and the frequency of positive 
imagery-based future TUTs, rs (40) = − 0.28, p = 0.07. This 
indicates that higher dysphoria levels are associated with 
greater tendency to generate negative imagery-based future-
TUTs, and to a smaller extent, reduced tendency to generate 
positive imagery-based future-TUTs.
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Testing the emotional specificity of observed effects
To assess whether the observed negative relationship 
between BDI-II scores and Imagery Future TUT Positivity 
Bias Scores is specific to emotional TUTs, BDI-II scores 
were correlated with the percentage of Imagery Future TUTs 
that were emotionally neutral. No significant relationship 
between BDI-II scores and neutral imagery future TUT fre-
quency was found, rs (40) = 0.05, p = 0.75, indicating the 
dysphoria-linked bias does not appear to reflect biases in the 
generalized tendency to experience future-TUTs involving 
mental imagery.
Testing the representational format specificity of observed 
effects
To assess whether the observed depression-linked bias is 
specific to future-oriented emotional TUTs involving mental 
imagery, the relationship between depression symptom level 
and the frequency of future-oriented emotional TUTs not 
involving mental imagery was assessed. No significant rela-
tionship was found between BDI-II scores and Non-imagery 
Future-TUT Positivity Bias Scores, rs (40) = − 0.10, p = 0.53. 
This indicates that the dysphoria-linked decrease in positive 
bias for future-TUTs was specific to future-TUTs involving 
mental imagery.
Testing the temporal specificity of observed effects
The relationship between depression symptom level and the 
frequency of past-oriented emotional TUTs involving men-
tal imagery was examined to assess whether the observed 
depression-linked valence bias was specific to future-ori-
ented emotional TUTs involving mental imagery. BDI-II 
score was found to be not significantly related to Imagery 
Past-TUT Positivity Bias Scores, rs (40) = − 0.02, p = 0.89. 
The results indicate dysphoria level was not associated with 
a mood-congruent bias in the frequency of emotional past-
oriented TUTs. The observed depression-linked reduction in 
positive relative to negative future-oriented TUTs involving 
mental imagery was therefore specific to TUTs with a future 
temporal orientation
Depression‑linked bias in emotional imagery future‑TUT 
vividness
No significant relationship was found between BDI-II scores 
and mean vividness ratings for negative future imagery-
TUTs, r (40) = 0.09, p = 0.80; or mean vividness ratings 
for positive future imagery-TUTs, r (40) = − 0.09, p = 0.67, 
indicating dysphoria level is not related to the vividness of 
emotional future imagery-TUTs.
Discussion
The present study investigated the presence of depression-
linked bias in the tendency to engage in spontaneous men-
tal imagery-based future thinking. As hypothesized, results 
showed that when not instructed to deliberately generate task 
unrelated cognition of any kind, higher depression scores 
were associated with lower positive bias in the frequency 
of imagery-based emotional future-oriented task unrelated 
thoughts (TUTs). This depression-linked reduction in posi-
tive future imagery bias was driven by an increasing ten-
dency to generate negative future imagery, and a decreasing 
tendency to generate positive future imagery. While the posi-
tive relationship between BDI-II score and the proportional 
frequency of positive future imagery approached statistical 
significance, the magnitude of the relationship (r s = − 0.28) 
can be considered of moderate effect size in individual dif-
ference research (Gignac & Szodorai, 2016). Importantly, 
no relationship was observed between depression scores 
and the frequency of emotionally neutral future imagery, 
indicating the observed depression-linked effect was specific 
to emotional future imagery. In addition, depression scores 
were not related to future-oriented TUTs that did not involve 
mental imagery (verbal-linguistic representation only), indi-
cating that the observed depression-linked bias was specific 
to imagery-based future cognition. Finally, depression scores 
Fig. 1  Scatterplot depicting a negative relationship between BDI-
II scores and Imagery Future-TUT Positivity Bias Scores. A higher 
score indicates more positive imagery future-TUTs were generated 
than negative imagery future-TUTs (as proportional to total to TUT 
frequency). The trend line was fitted using robust regression using 
maximum likelihood estimates (instead of ordinary least squares esti-
mates) to minimize the influence of outliers
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were not related to the frequency of imagery-based past-
oriented TUTs, indicating that the observed bias was specific 
to future imagery.
Implications
Results from the study indicate that when engaging in off-
task mindwandering, individuals with higher levels of symp-
toms of depression may be more likely to experience nega-
tive relative to positive mental imagery representations of 
the future than those with lower levels of depression symp-
toms. What might this mean in daily life? Previous experi-
ence sampling research suggests that up to half of waking 
mental life may consist of thoughts unrelated to the task at 
hand that occur spontaneously, without explicit purpose or 
intention (Killingsworth & Gilbert, 2010; McVay, Kane, & 
Kwapil, 2009). The same pattern has been found in a diary 
study examining naturally occurring mental imagery-based 
cognition (Kosslyn, Seger, Pani, & Hillger, 1990). As such, 
given the capacity for mental imagery to evoke emotional 
response (Ji et al., 2016), a greater tendency to experience 
task unrelated negative relative to positive future imagery 
is likely to contribute to elevated negative emotional states 
and reduced positive emotional states, thereby contributing 
to emotional disturbance in depression.
The present research extends previous literature on future 
thinking in depression by providing empirical evidence that 
the depression-linked biases observed when participants 
were instructed to deliberately think of emotional future 
events (Holmes et al., 2016; MacLeod, 2016), which are 
also observed when participants are not instructed to delib-
erately generate task unrelated cognition of any kind. The 
present findings are consistent with theoretical accounts that 
implicate maladaptive spontaneous cognition in depression 
vulnerability, in part due to the potential of such thoughts 
to promote feelings of hopelessness and pessimistic beliefs 
about the future (Marchetti, Koster, Klinger, & Alloy, 2016; 
Miloyan, Pachana, & Suddendorf, 2014). Importantly, 
results from the present study suggest that it may be spe-
cifically the tendency to generate imagery-based mental 
representations of the future that is specifically implicated 
in depression. The findings also corroborate previous ret-
rospective self-report studies that indicate impoverished 
experiences of positive relative to negative future imagery 
in depression (Weßlau & Steil, 2014) and dysphoria (Weßlau 
et al., 2015) in daily life. If future studies using clinical sam-
ples replicate the present findings, this would indicate that 
depression is associated with a reduction in the general like-
lihood of experiencing positive relative to negative mental 
representations of the future involving mental imagery.
Furthermore, the present study also extends research on 
spontaneous past-oriented cognition by examining the role 
of mental representational format. It is somewhat surprising 
that the present study did not find any relationship between 
spontaneous past-oriented mental imagery and dysphoria 
level, given previous findings concerning past-oriented 
spontaneous cognition using similar sustained attention 
to response tasks. Such studies have found a greater ten-
dency in past-oriented task unrelated thinking to be associ-
ated with depressed mood (Smallwood & O’Connor, 2011; 
Smallwood, O’Connor, Sudbery, & Obonsawin, 2007) and 
depression (Hoffmann et al., 2016). However, it is worth 
noting that such studies did not employ the use of cues to 
trigger TUTs. Research comparing SART tasks with concur-
rent verbal cues, relative to the same task without concurrent 
verbal cues, found that verbal cues increased the frequency 
of past-oriented TUTs and decreased the frequency of 
future-oriented TUTs, but did not modulate the frequency of 
present-oriented or atemporal TUTs (Vannucci, Pelagatti, & 
Marchetti, 2017). Previous research employing verbal cues 
has found that past-oriented TUTs occurred more frequently 
than future-oriented TUTs overall, but the tendency to spon-
taneously experience past-oriented TUTs was not modulated 
by dysphoria (Plimpton et al., 2015). Although Plimpton 
et al. (2015) did not delineate the nature of past-oriented 
TUTs based on their representational format, consistent with 
their findings, post-hoc exploratory analysis of the present 
data indicated no significant relationship between BDI-II 
scores and the frequency of past-oriented TUTs overall (rs 
= − 0.19, p = 0.21).
It is also worth noting that the present study found no 
relationship between dysphoria level and the frequency of 
negative or positive TUTs not involving mental imagery (all 
rs < |0.11|, all p > 0.63). This may at first appear surpris-
ing given that depression is associated with rumination, a 
predominantly verbal-linguistic form of internally generated 
passive thinking mode focused on the causes and negative 
consequences of one’s problems and depressive symptoms 
(Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991). However, more recent research 
indicate that sensory-perceptual representations are also 
highly prevalent in depressive cognition (Moritz et  al., 
2014), with more recent measures of repetitive negative 
thinking (including rumination) assessing the frequency 
of both thoughts (verbal-linguistic) and images (McEvoy, 
Hayes, Hasking, & Rees, 2017; Watkins, Moulds, & Mack-
intosh, 2005). As such, it is possible that depression-linked 
biases in past-oriented spontaneous cognition are more 
readily observable at clinical levels of depression, but such 
thoughts are likely to involve both imagery and verbal-lin-
guistic representations. Of course, given that TUTs that did 
not involve any mental imagery comprised only 36% of total 
TUTs, it is possible that floor effects in the frequency of 
such TUTs make possible relationships difficult to detect. 
For example, it is possible that the exclusive use of audi-
tory cues preferentially promoted the natural occurrence of 
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mental imagery-based cognition, relative to purely verbal-
linguistic cognition due to modality-specific task load that 
disproportionately taxes the phonological loop component of 
working memory (Repovs & Baddeley, 2006). Future studies 
could test this possibility by comparing two versions of the 
present task, one presenting auditory cues, and one present-
ing visual cues.
Limitations
A possible limitation of the task is that self-reporting of 
task unrelated thinking may have influenced the natural 
occurrence of such thinking compared to probe-caught 
approaches. Both self- and probe-caught approaches prime 
participants’ awareness of off-task thinking, and while self-
caught mindwandering relies on participants’ monitoring of 
their own conscious experience (Giambra, 1993; Schooler, 
2002), previous research suggests that it does not alter phe-
nomenological experience during undemanding cognitive 
tasks (Schooler, 2002; Smallwood, Baracaia, Lowe, & Obon-
sawin, 2003). However, previous research employing both 
self-caught as well as probe-caught mindwandering found 
thought probes caught additional TUTs not self-reported by 
participants (Schooler, 2002), indicating that studies using 
only self-caught TUT reporting may still underestimate the 
true occurrence of TUTs. In addition, even with the employ-
ment of cues and a “self-caught” approach to assessing TUT 
occurrence, frequencies of future-oriented TUTs were still 
low when analysed as a function of emotional valence and 
representational format. Future studies investigating indi-
vidual differences in spontaneous cognition frequency may 
benefit from employing both self-caught and probe-caught 
approaches, and/or to seek to specifically evoke higher future 
focus during the task, such as priming current concerns.
In addition, the present results should be interpreted with 
caution as the study had a relatively small sample size, par-
ticularly due to the loss of three participants for the main 
analysis (with even fewer participants in some analyses due 
to the lack of TUTs reported that are of the category under 
examination), and four participants for the cue recognition 
memory task, leading to reduced power to detect true effects. 
Further validation of the present results using larger samples 
will be required to assess the reliability of the present results.
Further, it is likely that both the self-caught and probe-
caught approaches to assess task unrelated thinking impacts 
on the natural flow of task unrelated thinking by requiring 
participants to report on the occurrence of task unrelated 
thinking. The present results therefore must be interpreted 
within the context of a controlled laboratory environment 
designed to encourage the occurrence of off-task thinking 
as well as reporting of its occurrence. Further, it must be 
acknowledged that asking participants to answer specific 
questions about the nature of task unrelated thinking (e.g. 
representational format, valence, and temporal orientation) 
may influence the general occurrence of task unrelated 
thinking. However, given that no emphasis was drawn to 
specific types of TUTs within each characteristic category 
(i.e. thoughts of a particular representational format, valence 
or temporal orientation), observed biases in the occurrence 
of TUTs within such characteristic categories are unlikely to 
be influenced by the need to report on the presence or nature 
of task unrelated thinking in general.
Finally, another limitation of the study is that the spon-
taneous occurrence of TUTs was operationalised as those 
occurring without instructions to deliberately generate task 
unrelated cognition of any kind, but the extent to which such 
TUTs occurred with or without intention was not further 
assessed. Given recent research on the dissociation between 
unintentional and intentional mindwandering (Seli, Carriere, 
& Smilek, 2015; Seli, Risko, & Smilek, 2016), delineat-
ing between depression-linked differences in the tendency 
to intentionally versus unintentionally engage in emotional 
future thinking may provide further insight into nature of 
cognitive biases underlying depression.
Future directions
To further illuminate the role of biased tendency to sponta-
neously engage in emotional imagery-based future thinking, 
future research should replicate the present effects in clini-
cal populations. In addition, while the present study used 
emotional words that were not selected to be of specific rel-
evance to depression, previous research indicates that self-
relevance of cues is associated with greater mood-congru-
ent bias effects in depression (cf. Wisco, 2009). Therefore, 
future studies could test whether the use of depression-rele-
vant emotional cues are associated with stronger outcomes, 
particularly in clinical populations. In addition, to advance 
the present line of research further, future research could 
investigate the degree to which the occurrence of sponta-
neous emotional imagery-based future thinking contributes 
to on-going emotional experience in depression, such as 
assessing state emotion change before, during, and after the 
TUTT task.
The present study showcases a novel laboratory paradigm 
for eliciting TUTs that can assess depression-linked individ-
ual differences in the tendency to experience future-oriented 
imagery. Such tasks can fruitfully be used within transla-
tional studies, such as emerging interventions that aim to 
tackle depression via training cognition to be more positive 
and less negative, such as future cognitive bias modification 
of interpretation (CBM-I) research (for a review, see Menne-
Lothmann et al. 2014). Future CBM-I training studies could 
employ the present laboratory task as a measure of far trans-
fer to assess the impact of interpretation bias training effects 
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on the spontaneous tendency to experience positive relative 
to negative thoughts.
It would be important for future research to investigate 
the underlying causes of depression-linked biases in the ten-
dency to imagine emotional experiences in the future, such 
as the role of negative interpretations of ambiguous infor-
mation and negative expectations of the future. At the same 
time, future research should also examine the downstream 
impacts of biased tendency to engage in emotional imagery-
based future thinking in dysphoria and depression. Using the 
same experimental paradigm, future studies could measure 
the degree to which variation in state emotions after the task 
are accounted for by the occurrence of negative and positive 
future imagery during the task. Further, given the growing 
theoretical focus and empirical evidence that imagery-based 
mental simulations of future events facilitate decision-mak-
ing, planning and self-regulatory behaviour (Bulley, Henry, 
& Suddendorf, 2016; Gilbert & Wilson, 2007; Kappes & 
Morewedge, 2016; Seligman, Railton, Baumeister, & Sri-
pada, 2013; Szpunar, Spreng, & Schacter, 2014; Taylor, 
Pham, Rivkin, & Armor, 1998), future research should 
examine how biases in imagery-based future thinking impact 
decision-making, planning and self-regulation in depression.
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